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Human Rights and the International 





The International Criminal Court (ICC) was established in 1998, with the aim of 
ending impunity for the perpetrators of the most serious crimes of concern to the 
international community (ICC Statute, 1998, preamble). The ICC became operational 
in 2002 and by today, 122 states are parties to the ICC Statute. Final judgments have 
been issued in cases arising from situations in Mali, the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo, and the Central African Republic, and trials are ongoing for individuals 
alleged to have committed war crimes and/or crimes against humanity in Uganda, 
Côte d’Ivoire, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. A number of suspects 
remain at large. 
This chapter seeks to situate the ICC as an institution within the machinery of the 
international human rights legal framework. In so doing, it notes that the ICC is not 
itself a human rights court but that it nevertheless bears an important role in the 
protection, development, and interpretation of human rights. Part 1 examines the 
development of the ICC, and notes international criminal law’s shared ancestry with 
international human rights law, insofar as both bodies of law were developed in the 
aftermath of World War II. Part 2 of this chapter discusses the interplay between 
human rights and the International Criminal Court, in particular examining the role of 
human rights organisations in providing evidence for ICC trials, and human rights 
law’s status as a source of law before the ICC. Part 3 analyses the impact of the ICC 
in developing, protecting, and interpreting human rights. In setting out the four core 
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crimes falling within the ICC’s jurisdiction, it highlights that serious human rights 
violations can constitute international crimes. It also discusses the role of human 
rights in shaping the ICC’s procedure and the right to a fair trial before the Court. In 
sum, this chapter demonstrates a symbiotic relationship between human rights and the 
ICC, in that human rights law bears an important influence over the law and practice 
of the ICC, while the ICC itself plays a role in the progressive development of human 
rights.  
 
The Development of the ICC and its Character as a Judicial Institution 
 
The Parallel Development of Human Rights and International Criminal Law 
The founding international human rights legal instrument, the Universal Declaration 
on Human Rights (UDHR), was signed on 10 December 1948. The UDHR was 
clearly influenced by a recognition that the horrors suffered in the Second World War 
should never happen again; its preamble noted that ‘disregard and contempt for 
human rights have resulted in barbarous acts which have outraged the conscience of 
mankind’. The UDHR, a non-binding instrument, led in turn to the twin binding 
international treaties of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and 
the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, both adopted in 
1966. Since the adoption of these treaties, specialized UN treaties on human rights 
have been adopted; these include the Convention against Torture; the Convention on 
the Elimination of Discrimination against Women; the Convention on the Rights of 
the Child, and the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, amongst 
others. 
Most commentators trace the birth of international criminal law to the Treaty of 
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Versailles in 1919, which publicly arraigned Kaiser Wilhelm II and stated that he 
would be tried by ‘a special tribunal’ comprised of five judges, one from each of the 
following: Great Britain, USA, France, Italy and Japan (Schabas, 2017, p.3; Cryer et 
al., p. 116; Treaty of Versailles, Article 227). This intention was ultimately unfulfilled 
after the Kaiser fled to Holland, which refused to extradite him (Schabas, 2017, p. 3; 
Bassiouni, 1997, p. 14). In August 1945, the Allied Powers created the International 
Military Tribunal (IMT) at Nuremberg, which was followed in 1946 by the 
International Military Tribunal for the Far East at Tokyo. The IMT issued its 
judgment on 1 October 1946, and in December of that year, the principles of law in 
the Nuremberg Tribunal’s Charter and its judgment were affirmed by the UN General 
Assembly, which asked the International Law Commission (ILC) to commence work 
on ‘a general codification of offences against the peace and security of mankind, or of 
an International Criminal Code’ (UNGA Resolution 95(I), 1946).  
On 9 December 1948 (the day before the adoption of the UDHR), two significant 
developments in the creation of contemporary international criminal law emerged. 
First, the Genocide Convention was adopted, establishing an international crime of 
genocide that could be tried by domestic courts or ‘such international penal tribunal as 
may have jurisdiction’. Relatedly, the General Assembly requested that the ILC begin 
work on the possibility of creating an international judicial body that could try 
international crimes (UNGA Resolution 280(III), 1948). Owing to Cold War politics, 
it would be 50 years before that permanent international criminal tribunal would be 
established. In the interim, two ad hoc international tribunals were created by the UN 
Security Council to prosecute those deemed most responsible for atrocities in the 
former Yugoslavia and Rwanda. Since 1998, international or ‘internationalized’ (i.e. 
hybrid creations of states’ judicial systems with jurisdiction over international crimes 
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and international judges) criminal tribunals have been established for Sierra Leone, 
Cambodia, East Timor, Lebanon, and Kosovo, amongst others (Romano et al., 2004).  
 
Thus, the development of both international criminal law and international human 
rights law share a heritage that can be traced back to the end of the Second World 
War. That influence continues today – some 50 years after the adoption of the UDHR, 
the ICC noted, in a strikingly similar preambular paragraph to the UDHR’s equivalent 
quoted above, that ‘during this century millions of children, women and men have 
been victims of unimaginable atrocities that deeply shock the conscience of 
humanity.’ The growth of both bodies of law reflects the individualization of 
international law, which had traditionally been the premise of states alone. As the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) noted, ‘the 
impetuous development and propagation in the international community of human 
rights doctrines… has brought about significant changes in international law, notably 
in the approach to problems besetting the world community. A State-sovereignty-
oriented approach has been gradually supplanted by a human-being-oriented 
approach.’ (Tadić, 1995, § 97) 
 
The ICC as a Human Rights Institution 
Unlike the ICTY and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), the ICC 
does not have primacy over domestic courts. The ICTR and ICTY could demand that 
states defer to their jurisdiction and transfer defendants to stand trial before them, 
although they could choose to transfer cases of lower-level offenders to domestic 
jurisdictions if they were satisfied that the accused would receive a fair trial and 
would not be subject to the death penalty. Both the ICTY and ICTR could keep such 
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transfers under review through trial monitoring, and demand that the domestic court 
transfer the accused back to the international tribunal if they were concerned that he 
or she was not receiving a fair trial or that there was a risk that the death penalty 
might be imposed (Gradoni, 2007). This monitoring role has now been passed to their 
successor institution, the Mechanism for the International Criminal Tribunals. 
By contrast, under a principle known as complementarity, there is a preference that 
domestic trials be carried out for the crimes within the jurisdiction of the ICC. The 
ICC can only have jurisdiction over a case where a domestic state having jurisdiction 
over the same case is either unwilling or unable to put the accused on trial (El Zeidy, 
2008; Kleffner, 2008).  
In the Libya situation before the ICC, a debate arose as to whether the ICC could 
refuse to defer jurisdiction over two cases to Libya, where it seemed likely that the 
accused would be sentenced to the death penalty if convicted, and where there were 
doubts as to whether they could receive a fair trial. Libya argued that fair trial and 
death penalty considerations could not come into the Court’s decision on jurisdiction, 
provided it was willing and able to put the accused on trial, because the ICC was not 
designed to act as a human rights court (Gaddafi, 2013, §§ 199-203). Ultimately, the 
ICC determined that the Libyan state was unable to try Saif Gaddafi because he was 
in the hands of rebels in Zintan, but that, notwithstanding concerns about his lack of 
access to counsel, Libya was both willing and able to try its former intelligence chief, 
Abdullah Al Senussi (Al Senussi, 2014, §§ 169-198). That being said, as I have 
argued elsewhere, the Al Senussi judgment did seemingly leave the possibility open to 
accepting fair trial concerns in future complementarity challenges (McDermott, 2016: 
p. 161). The Chamber noted that the failure to provide Al Senussi with a lawyer in 
advance of trial would not be such an egregious violation that would render the 
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proceedings incapable of providing justice. This suggests that egregious violations of 
the right to a fair trial, such as, perhaps, the use of evidence obtained by torture, could 
reach that threshold and could be considered by the ICC in future complementarity 
cases.  
 
Thus, unlike the ICTY and ICTR, the ICC does not have the capacity to consider such 
issues as the right to a fair trial and the death penalty when deferring jurisdiction to 
domestic courts. This weakens its position as a court committed to protecting human 
rights, compared to the ad hoc tribunals. Nevertheless, the ICC has the capacity to 
develop human rights law through its jurisprudence on the core international crimes 
and on the right to a fair trial of persons facing trial before it, as Parts 2 and 3 of this 
chapter demonstrate.  
 
The Interplay between Human Rights and the ICC 
 
Human Rights as a Source of Law before the ICC 
Article 21(3) of the ICC Statute imposes an obligation on the Court to interpret its law 
in a manner that is consistent with international human rights law. The Appeals 
Chamber in Lubanga determined that Article 21(3) means that the interpretation as 
well as the application of the law is subject to internationally recognised human 
rights. The Chamber held that, ‘[Article 21(3)] requires the exercise of the jurisdiction 
of the Court in accordance with internationally recognized human rights norms.’ 
(Lubanga, 2006, § 36) 
This obligation has been expounded upon in discussions on substantive aspects of the 
law. The Court has relied on human rights law in finding that the recruitment of child 
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soldiers by non-state armed groups constitutes a war crime (Lubanga, 2012, Separate 
and Dissenting Opinion of Judge Odio Benito, § 13). Procedural human rights 
standards were instructive in interpreting the defendant’s right to be informed of the 
charges against him (Lubanga, 2012, Dissenting Opinion of Judge Fulford, § 20). 
Where applying a provision of the ICC Statute would effectively breach human rights 
law, the ICC has held that the Court’s human rights obligations must prevail (Katanga 
and Chui, 2011, § 73). As a result of this provision, the case law of human rights 
tribunals has been extensive before the ICC (Zeegers, 2016).  
 
The Interplay between Human Rights Organisations and the ICC 
Given its temporal and geographic distance from the crimes upon which it adjudges, 
and given the fallibilities of witness testimony, the ICC relies heavily on 
contemporaneous accounts of crimes. It is perhaps unsurprising that a large number of 
such accounts come from human rights organisations, working on the ground in the 
affected regions. Such evidence is not without its deficiencies – in Katanga, the Trial 
Chamber noted that ‘the preparation of a report on an investigation of human rights 
violations is not subject to the same criteria as those for a criminal investigation’, 
given that the sources of the information therein are often (anonymous) hearsay or 
oral testimony, and are not subjected to rigorous scrutiny by the author of the report in 
a manner akin to cross-examination (Katanga, 2014, § 326). Similarly, in Lubanga, 
the Chamber received evidence that ‘human rights and humanitarian organizations are 
lousy criminal investigators. They are not producing forensic evidence that can be 
used by a Prosecutor’ (Lubanga, 2012, § 130).  
On the other hand, the involvement of the Fédération Internationale des Ligues des 
Droits de l’Homme (FIDH) was crucial in the Bemba case. The FIDH had published a 
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report in 2003 outlining crimes committed by Bemba’s MLC troops in the Central 
African Republic. Bemba wrote to the FIDH’s President, informing him that 
prosecutions would be undertaken for these crimes; the President, in turn, responded 
outlining some concerns on the sufficiency of those prosecutions, and encouraging 
Bemba to co-operate with the ICC (Bemba, 2016, §§ 607-611). This evidence was 
crucial in establishing the responsibility of Bemba as a commander over the MLC 
troops – having been made aware of the crimes, and having failed to adequately 
punish them, he bore responsibility under Article 28 of the ICC Statute. One would 
hope that over time, and with the advent of technologies that can record events and 
testimony and store it securely on remote servers, human rights organisations will 
become even more adept at gathering reliable evidence in a manner that is useful to 
the ICC and other courts.  
 
The Role of the ICC in Developing, Interpreting, and Protecting Human Rights 
 
Core Crimes 
The ICC currently has jurisdiction over the crimes of genocide, crimes against 
humanity, and war crimes. It is likely that it will have jurisdiction over the crime of 
aggression at some time in the future, when two-thirds of states parties have ratified 
the amendments agreed upon at the ICC Review Conference at Kampala in 2010. 
Each of these crimes is closely related to human rights, and by adjudging upon them, 
the ICC, notwithstanding the fact that it is not formally part of the international 
human rights law framework, progressively develops human rights protection 
worldwide. It might be assumed that only breaches of civil and political rights (such 
as the right to life, right to be free from torture, right to a fair trial, and right to liberty) 
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fall under the ambit of international criminal law. However, as Evelyne Schmid has 
convincingly argued, breaches of economic, social and cultural rights may also 
constitute international crimes, in certain circumstances (Schmid, 2015).  
 
Genocide 
Genocide, often dubbed ‘the crime of crimes’ is the commission of one of five 
prohibited acts (killing, causing serious bodily or mental harm, inflicting conditions of 
life calculated to bring about destruction; imposing measures to prevent births, and 
forcible transfer of children) against a national, ethnic, racial, or religious group with 
the intent to destroy that group (Schabas, 2009). Aside from a breach of the right to 
life implicit in the first of these acts, the other acts have clear human rights 
implications. In the situation relating to Darfur, Sudan, the Pre-Trial Chamber has 
issued a warrant of arrest against Sudanese President, Omar al-Bashir, for genocide 
under the form of serious bodily or mental harm, noting that acts of rape, torture, and 
forced displacement (all themselves human rights violations) had been committed 
(Bashir, 2010, § 30). Al-Bashir was also charged with imposing conditions of life 
calculated to bring about the destruction of the group, with the ICC noting that 
displacement, destroying a group’s means of survival, usurpation of land, and denial 
of medical treatment could also be acts of genocide (Bashir, 2010, § 34). 
 
War Crimes 
War crimes are serious violations of the laws of armed conflict, and are criminalized 
under Article 8 of the ICC Statute for both international and non-international armed 
conflicts. The conduct that can constitute war crimes encompasses a broad range of 
human rights abuses, such as torture, murder, rape, pillage (thus denying victims’ 
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right to property) and the right to a fair trial. Article 8 also criminalizes certain 
conduct such as causing widespread, severe and long-lasting damage to the 
environment; using certain types of weapons and methods of warfare, and launching 
attacks against buildings dedicated to religion, education, art, science or charitable 
purposes, historic monuments, and hospitals. While these additional categories of war 
crimes do not explicitly link to a particular human right, their nexus to the human 
rights of those in affected territories is obvious. Environmental damage affects the 
right to health and the right to life; prohibited weapons can cause torture or inhumane 
treatment, and launching attacks against protected buildings and monuments impacts 
upon victims’ right to freedom of belief, education, culture, and health.  
The ICC has not been afraid to extend the limits of the war crimes regime set down in 
the Statute to achieve greater protection for victims. Notably, a recent decision of the 
Appeals Chamber found that war crimes could be committed against fellow 
combatants from the same armed forces as the perpetrator. This runs contrary to 
conventional understandings and an ordinary reading of international humanitarian 
law, which seeks to protect certain categories of persons – civilians and those not 
directly taking part in hostilities, prisoners of war, and wounded, sick and 
shipwrecked combatants. The Appeals Chamber noted the ‘seemingly unprecedented 
nature’ of its findings, and the fact that it was unaware of any previous case where the 
international humanitarian law regime was applied to victims from the same armed 
forces as the perpetrator (Ntaganda, 2017, §§ 60, 67). Despite noting that Common 
Article 3 protects against inhumane treatment, ‘requiring only that the persons were 
taking no active part in hostilities at the material time’ (Ntaganda, 2017, § 60; 
emphasis added), the Appeals Chamber found that there was no reason to believe that 
international humanitarian law ‘suggests any limits on who may be victims’ of war 
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crimes under the jurisdiction of the ICC (Ntaganda, 2017, § 64). As such, it declined 
to enter into any discussion as to whether the victims were actively participating in 
hostilities at the time, finding that the requirement that the persons were taking no 
active part in hostilities does not exist (Ntaganda, 2017, § 69). This is a remarkable 
volte-face in the space of fewer than ten paragraphs of a decision. Moreover, while 
this decision has been hailed as ‘an enormously important contribution to 
international criminal law’ (Grey, 2017), it does raise issues on the right to a fair trial 
and the principle of nullum crimen sine lege in practice (McDermott, 2017). 
Ironically, while attempting to broaden the scope of the ICC’s jurisdiction to cover 
the heinous crimes suffered by the victims (which are undoubtedly crimes under 
national law, and might arguably be better suited to domestic prosecution), the ICC 
could be breaching another human right – the right to a fair trial – itself.  
Another interesting issue on the interplay between international criminal law and 
international human rights law arises when both bodies of law prohibit the same 
conduct, but each bears different jurisdictional or definitional issues. This arose in the 
case of Kunarac before the ICTY, where torture was prosecuted as a war crime. 
Under the Convention against Torture, torture is defined as: 
 
any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is 
intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining from him or 
a third person information or a confession, punishing him for an act he or a 
third person has committed or is suspected of having committed, or 
intimidating or coercing him or a third person, or for any reason based on 
discrimination of any kind, when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the 
instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other 
person acting in an official capacity. It does not include pain or suffering 
arising only from, inherent in or incidental to lawful sanctions. 
 
 
The problem for the prosecution in Kunarac was that the acts of torture committed 
were neither committed by or at the instigation of a public or state official, and nor 
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were they for the purposes of obtaining information or a confession, or similar. To 
circumvent this issue, the ICTY noted that the Convention against Torture was 
addressed to states to prevent acts of torture being committed by states, and it was for 
that reason that the definition in the Convention focused on individuals acting on 
behalf of the state or its organs in an official capacity (Kunarac, 2002, § 146). Thus, 
while international human rights law does act as an interpretative guide for certain 
war crimes, the ICC and other international criminal tribunals may see fit to derogate 
from the definitional limits set down in human rights, by examining the object and 
purpose of human rights statutes vis-à-vis international criminal law statutes. 
 
Crimes against Humanity 
Crimes against humanity occur when certain acts are committed as part of a 
widespread or systematic attack against a civilian population. Article 7 of the ICC 
Statute enumerates 11 acts that constitute crimes against humanity when committed as 
part of such an attack. They are: murder, torture, rape and other forms of sexual 
violence, enslavement, deportation, extermination, deprivation of liberty, enforced 
disappearances, apartheid, persecution, and other inhumane acts of similar gravity. As 
with war crimes, the parallels between the underlying acts and human rights 
violations are clear. Some crimes against humanity, such as enforced disappearance 
and apartheid, are themselves subject to international treaties, but Article 7 represents 
the first time that such violations have been defined as international crimes falling 
within the jurisdiction of an international criminal court (Schabas, 2016: pp. 202-
206). Two specific crimes against humanity – persecution and other inhumane acts – 
are very closely linked to international human rights law and, as such, warrant further 
elucidation. 
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Persecution is defined as the intentional and severe denial, contrary to international 
law, of a fundamental right on the basis of political, racial, national, ethnic, cultural, 
religious, gender, or other grounds that are recognised as impermissible under 
international law. In Blé Goudé, the Pre-Trial Chamber considered that rapes, murders 
and injuries committed by forces loyal to former Côte d’Ivoire President, Laurent 
Gbagbo, against perceived supporters of Alassane Ouattara in the wake of an election 
lost by Gbagbo could constitute acts of persecution. Interestingly, the Chamber found 
that the acts were committed not just on political grounds, but also on ethnic, national 
and religious grounds, as members of certain ethnic, national and religious groups 
were presumed to be Ouattara supporters and targeted on that basis (Blé Goudé, 2014, 
§§ 123-124). Persecution might also cover situations where the victims were denied 
the right to employment, to liberty, to a proper judicial process, or other fundamental 
rights as part of a discriminatory pattern of behaviour (Nilsson, 2011, p. 233). 
The crime of ‘other inhumane acts’ constitutes conduct of a similar character to the 
enumerated acts constituting crimes against humanity, which intentionally cause great 
suffering or serious bodily injury or physical or mental health. One recent debate that 
has arisen in the jurisprudence of the ICC is whether the practice of forced marriage 
constitutes a separate crime against humanity, falling under other inhumane acts. 
Article 7 already includes slavery as a crime against humanity, and sexual slavery as a 
separate crime against humanity. Thus, the question arises as to whether a third form 
of criminalization for the same conduct is necessary, or whether it would be 
preferable to prosecute forced marriage as either slavery or sexual slavery. In 
Katanga, the ICC preferred the latter approach, finding that the crime of sexual 
slavery adequately encompassed acts of forced marriage (Katanga, 2008, §§ 428-
433). By contrast, the Chamber in Ongwen found that forced marriage may qualify as 
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a separate crime against humanity under ‘other inhumane acts’, and that the practice 
differed from sexual slavery ‘in terms of conduct, ensuing harm, and protected 
interests.’ (Ongwen, 2016, §§ 87-95) This example shows that the ICC’s 
jurisprudence continues to evolve and develop to incorporate new interpretations of 
the law, in order to punish offenders for serious human rights violations. The 
creativity of international judges in interpreting the law has been widely discussed in 
the literature (Darcy and Powderly, 2010; Shahabuddeen, 2014). 
 
Aggression 
The Nuremberg and Tokyo Tribunals tried individuals for the crime of planning, 
preparing, initiating, or waging a war of aggression, or a war in violation of 
international legal instruments. Since then, no international criminal tribunal has 
prosecuted a defendant for this crime. It was agreed at the drafting of the ICC Statute 
that the Court should exercise jurisdiction over the crime of aggression. However, the 
state parties negotiating the ICC Statute could not agree upon a definition of this 
crime. In particular, there was debate over the jurisdictional issues surrounding the 
crime, such as whether the Prosecutor could launch an investigation acting proprio 
motu (on her own initiative) or on the basis of a referral by a state party. Because of 
these difficulties, no definition of aggression was included in the Statute upon its 
adoption in 1998. Instead, Article 5(2) noted that the Court would exercise 
jurisdiction over the crime once a definition and provisions on the exercise of 
jurisdiction had been agreed in accordance with the review and amendment process 
set out in Articles 121 and 123 of the Statute.  
That agreement was ultimately reached at the ICC Review Conference in Kampala in 
2010. There are two jurisdictional pre-conditions for the ICC’s jurisdiction over this 
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crime; first, 30 states must ratify the amendments (Palestine became the 30th state to 
ratify the amendments in June 2016), and second, some time after 1 January 2017, a 
two-thirds majority of states parties must take a decision permitting the Court to 
exercise jurisdiction over the crime in the future. 
What does the crime of aggression mean for the ICC’s role in protecting human 
rights? Aggression has traditionally been seen as a state crime, with the victims being 
not individuals, but the state whose sovereignty, territorial integrity, or political 
independence has been interfered with by the aggressor state. It is perhaps owing to 
this perception that high-profile human rights groups like Amnesty International and 
Human Rights Watch took a rather indifferent approach to the aggression 
amendments at the Kampala Review Conference (Schabas, 2012: p. 207). However, 
there is no question that acts of aggression between states can have a devastating 
impact on the human rights of citizens in affected territories, not least the right to life. 
A stand-alone right to peace was recognised by the UN General Assembly in 1984, 
noting that ‘life without war serves as the primary international prerequisite for the 
material well-being, development and progress of countries, and for the full 
implementation of the rights and fundamental human freedoms proclaimed by the 
United Nations’  (UNGA Resolution 39/11, 1984). If and when the ICC gains 
jurisdiction over this crime, it will bear a key role in developing the right to peace. 
 
Procedure and the Right to a Fair Trial 
The most notable influence of human rights law over the ICC has been in the realm of 
international criminal procedure, and as regards the right to a fair trial in particular. 
The ICC borrows extensively from international human rights courts and instruments 
in determining the rights of the accused. For example, in Ruto and Sang, the 
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Prosecutor had challenged the Trial Chamber’s decision permitting Kenya’s Deputy 
President Ruto to be voluntarily absent from trial. The Appeals Chamber, in 
upholding the decision, held that the right of the accused to be present at trial could be 
voluntarily waived. It found support for this position in the case law of the European 
Court of Human Rights, ICTR case law, and the African Commission on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights’ Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Fair Trial and Legal 
Assistance in Africa (Ruto, 2013, § 51).  Human rights have also been relied upon 
extensively in decisions on equality of arms (Lubanga, 2008, Partly dissenting 
opinion of Judge Pikis, § 14); witness protection measures (Katanga, 2009, §§ 32-33), 
the right to be informed of the charges, and ensuring that trials are both expeditious 
and fair (Katanga, 2013, Dissenting Opinion of Judge Cuno Tarfusser, § 8; Katanga, 
2010, Dissenting Opinion of Judge Erkki Kourula and Judge Ekaterina Trendafilova, 
§ 42).  
Not only does the ICC borrow extensively from human rights law, it also bears an 
illustrative function in demonstrating best practices to states, and providing an 
example of an international criminal procedure based on a mixed procedural model 
that is both closely modelled on, and bound to respect, international human rights 
standards. Amnesty International, in its most recent version of its Fair Trial Manual, 
relies on the standards of international criminal procedure in illustrating fair 
procedural standards. Thus, even though the Court refused to assume the role of a 
human rights court in examining the admissibility of the Al-Senussi case discussed in 
Part 2 above, this does not mean that it seeks to derogate from human rights standards 
in developing its own procedural practice. Indeed, the Court declares in its public 
literature that ‘[i]n all of its activities, the ICC observes the highest standards of 




The ICC, as the world’s first permanent international criminal institution, plays an 
important role in the global legal framework for the promotion, protection and 
fulfillment of human rights, despite the fact that it is not, itself, a human rights court. 
Unlike the ad hoc tribunals that preceded it, the ICC does not have primacy of 
jurisdiction, and this means that it cannot deem a case admissible before it purely on 
the basis that the accused would not receive a fair trial in a domestic court. This, from 
the outside, appears to weaken the ICC’s position as a cog in the machine of human 
rights protection.  
However, the ICC is bound to interpret its law in a manner that is consistent with 
international human rights law, and human rights standards have had a significant 
bearing on the development of international criminal law before the ICC. Conversely, 
the ICC has been able to bring about progressive developments in the interpretation of 
its core crimes, all of which are closely linked to human rights. In this manner, 
international criminal tribunals have influenced the development of human rights and 
international law more broadly. The synergies between human rights and the ICC’s 
legal framework are not limited to substantive legal issues. There is also evidence of 
an interplay between human rights and the ICC in procedural matters, especially in 
issues surrounding the accused’s right to a fair trial, and in investigations, where 
human rights organisations play a not insignificant role in the collection and 
preservation of evidence. Thus, the relationship is mutually beneficial in that human 
rights law informs and shapes ICC law and procedure, and ICC practice in turn feeds 
into the development of human rights law.  
It is apposite to end this chapter with a note of caution on expectations. As has been 
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seen in this chapter, the ICC is but one Court, with jurisdiction over tightly defined 
crimes and an obligation to respect the presumption of innocence and try cases in 
accordance with the criminal standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt. It is 
sometimes expected to play a greater role in international politics, by ending conflicts, 
deterring future atrocities, or forcing states to respect their human rights obligations, 
and is then found wanting against those unrealistic expectations. Despite the notable 
developments set out in this chapter, it is important to remember that the ICC is but 
one small part of a vast and often unwieldy machine of international justice, which 
comprises a range of bodies with different mandates, operational structures and 
powers. To quote the ICC Prosecutor, in her recent statement on the situation in 
Libya: 
To those of you who express to my Office your fears and disappointments, as 
well as your hopes and aspirations for the future of a Libya grounded on the 
pillars of justice where gross human rights violations are distant memories of 
the past, your calls for action do not fall on deaf ears… And while I am under 
no illusions that the International Criminal Court is a panacea – it surely is not 
– I, along with my team, are committed to playing our part. (ICC Prosecutor, 
2017) 
 
Ultimately, that is the best we can hope for with the ICC – that it will play its small 
part in the global march towards universal human rights, justice, and the rule of law.   
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